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THE NORTH KOREA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT:
SOUTH KOREAN AND INTERNATIONAL
EFFORTS AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE LAW
Shinbum Hant
INTRODUCTION

The severity of human rights infringement in North Korea is known
throughout the world. The Freedom House classifies North Korea as a
country that is "not free," and gives out the lowest grades on extent of
freedom, civil liberties, and political rights.' Amnesty International accuses
North Korea of being "in a category of its own when it comes to human
rights violations. '2 Human Rights Watch observes that the totalitarian rule
continued since Kim Jong-un gained power after his father's death in December 2011.3 There have been numerous cases of brutal authoritarianism
in history. Repression in North Korea is appalling, however, particularly in
this age when civilization as a whole made great strides in protection of
human dignity.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of the North
Korean Human Rights Act (NKRA)4 in South Korea. The U.S. and Japan
enacted laws addressing the issue in the 2000s, and international pressure
t I would like to thank Eunkyo Hong and Seung Yun Kim and for their research
assistance on recent economic and social development in North Korea. I also wish to
thank Jin-gyeong Lim for her graphical work.
1.Freedom in the World: North Korea, Freedom House, https:/ffreedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2014/north-korea#.VYinq IJYMrg (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
2. North Korea, Amnesty Int'l UK, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/North-Korea (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
3. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: North Korea 1.
4. The North Korea Human Rights Act, or NKHRA, means the bills submitted to
the National Assembly in South Korea, as well as the law which was finally enacted in
March 2016, unless it specifically indicates law in other countries on North Korean
human rights. See Ha-young Choi, S. Korean Assembly expects N. Korean human
rights bill soon, NK NEWS (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.nknews.org/2015/09/s-korean-assembly-expects-n-korean-human-rights-bill-soon/. The bills have different
names. The bill by Representative Hwang Jin-ha in June 2005, for example, was titled
Bukhan-jumin-ui indojeok jiwon mit in'gwon-jeungjin-e gwan-han beop-ryul-an (Bill
on Humanitarian Assistance and Improvement of Human Rights of North Korean Residents). The bills are collectively referred to as the North Korean Human Rights Act,
or NKHRA in this Article. The term does not include bills by the left-wing parties,
which provide for humanitarian assistance without reference to such institutions as
human rights foundation and archive.
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on North Korea is rising. South Korean legislators have been seeking to
ratify a similar law in their country since Representative Hwang Jin-ha 5 first
introduced NKHRA at a National Assembly committee 6 in June 2005. It
took the law more than a decade to come to a vote at the plenary session.
Possibility had appeared to be remote for NKHRA's ratification by the
end of the 19th Assembly, until DPRK's fourth nuclear test on January 6,
2016, and satellite launch on February 7, 2016, in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions turned the international opinion against
the country. Reaction was swift, as the Security Council passed Resolution
2270, sanction measures against Pyongyang. 7 South Korea and United
States launched one of the largest joint military drills in March, as Pyongyang continued to threaten a nuclear war. Seoul on its own imposed new
sanctions with asset freeze and the nullification of the project, which allowed Russian cargo to be transported to South and other countries through
North Korean port of Najin. Under such circumstances, lawmakers in Seoul
faced an urgent need to enact the law, and finally approved it on March 2, 8
right before the Assembly election in April 2016.
Opponents of NKHRA question whether the law would have any immediate or practical effect. The law won't turn North Korea into a utopia
overnight, but condemnation of the human rights situation by outsiders does
trouble Pyongyang. Furthermore, North Koreans are finally waking up to
events that occur outside their country, and they are realizing that the state
is not an entity to be followed absolutely. There are signs that citizens of
5. The terms in Korean language in this Article are written based on the Romanization system of Kuklip-kuk'eo-won (National Institute of Korean Language), except for
terms such as Park Geun-hye and Kim Il-sung, which are widely cited in international
media. Names of South and North Korean politicians, officials, and legislators are written with the family name first.
6. The name of the committee responsible for foreign relations and national unification changed over the years. Tong'il-oegyo-tongsang-wiwonhoe (Unification, Foreign
Affairs, Commerce Committee) was changed to Oegyo-tongsang-tong'il-wiwonhoe

(Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Unification Committee) in August 2008. See also Parliamentary bodies dealing with internationaltrade: ForeignAffairs and Unification Committee, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, http://www.ipu.org/english/parline/reports/

instance/2_305.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). The name again was changed to Oegyotong'il-wiwonhoe (Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, (FAUC)) in 2013. See
generally Foreign Affairs & Unification Committee, http://uft.na.go.kr/site (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016). The committee will be referred to as FAUC in this Article, irrespective
of its actual name.
7. The resolution, the strongest ever, provided, among other things, for cargo inspection, embargo, and expulsion of North Korea diplomats involved in violation of the
sanctions.
8. The law will go into effect on September 4, 2016.
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are yearning for a change,
and a day may come when they finally choose their leaders in a democratically held election.
I.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA

The North Korean state practices one of the most egregious forms of
human rights violations. The criminal justice system operates at the whim
of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), and public execution, beatings, and
other types of exploitation routinely occur. The government does not tolerate freedom of press, assembly, religion, or ideology. Elections are a sham,
and only journalism sponsored by the government is allowed. Between
80,000 and 120,000 inmates 9 are confined in four gwanliso.'0 The government seeks out underground church, and those caught practicing Christianity come under heavy punishment. Tens of thousands of small and large
statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are scattered throughout the country, to which residents pay respect.
Under the songbun" system, the population is classified into specific
classes along a social hierarchy, based on perceived allegiance to the regime. Those whose ancestors joined the anti-Japanese movement with Kim
Il-sung have the highest social status. A resident or a descendant of a resident who had a bourgeois background faces discrimination in food, job, and
other opportunities. Pyongyang is a privileged place, and only those who
2
are the best looking and possess proven loyalty can live in the city.'
In addition to political persecutions, the standard of living inside
DPRK is one of the lowest in the world. The communist economic system
which ignored market mechanism and did not reward individual incentives
was grossly inefficient.' 3 The theory of self-reliance (juche) notwithstanding, the Kim Il-sung government relied excessively on donations from its
communist allies, particularly the USSR, ever since the foundation of the
country after World War II. While Vietnam, China and other socialist countries embarked on economic restructuring in the 1980s and the 1990s,
DPRK refused to open its doors and further isolated itself. Default on foreign debt instruments by the mid-I 980s made it impossible for Pyongyang
9. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry on hum. rts. in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014).
10. Literally, a management center, a euphemism for a prison camp.

11. Status.
39, 41.
12. Rep. of the comm'n of inquir., supra note 9
13. North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-333, § 3(4); see
generally STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM (2007).
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to raise funds in the international financial market.' 4 The quantity of foreign
donations plummeted with the collapse of the USSR, and North Korean
economy nosedived.
The 1990s was an agonizing time for North Koreans as the breakdown
of the public distribution system forced them to endure gonan-ui
haeng'gun.'5 Ministry of Unification' 6 estimates that approximately
330,000 people died of hunger between 1996 and 2000,17 and many of those
who survived had difficult times, too. 8 Floods in 1995 and 1996 and a
drought in 1997 only worsened the plight.' 9
Arable land is limited in North Korea, particularly in the north with the
rugged, mountainous terrain. However, famine could have been eased or
even prevented through irrigation, forestation, and upgrading of hydropower facilities, and if Pyongyang did not wait until 1995 to actively appeal
for international relief.20 Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il and those with power did
not refrain from their extravagant lifestyles, regardless of the large-scale
21
pain and misery.
II.

WHITHER NORTH KOREA?

Even DPRK is not impervious to changes, however. In December
1991, Pyongyang launched a special economic zone in Rajin-Sonbong or
Rason, nearby the Chinese and Russian border, to draw investment from the
two countries. The manufacturing complex in Kaesong, a city 50 kilometers
north of Seoul, was one of the biggest collaborative projects between the
14. See HAGGARD & NOLAND, supra note 13, at 27-31; North Korea is Told of
Loan Default, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/23/world/
north-korea-is-told-of-loan-default.html.
15. Translated by the author as Arduous March. The term originally meant the
bitter struggle of Kim ll-sung and his peers in Manchuria from 1938 to 1939, in their
guerilla movement against Japanese colonialists. Pyongyang used the term in the 1990s,
as it urged residents to maintain their loyalty to the state despite searing poverty.
16. Tong'il-bu.
17. Bukhan jisik sajeon (Fact on North Korea), MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, http://
nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex=2&koreanChrctr
=&dicaryld=4 (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).

18. From mirror images to portraitsof contradiction, KOREA

JOONGANG DAILY

(Aug. 15, 2015), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=30
07921.
19. BRUCE CUMINGS, NORTH KOREA: ANOTHER COUNTRY 179-81 (2004).
20. Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9,
48-49, 51, 53. See generally
HAGGARD & NOLAND, supra note 13.
21. See, e.g., Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9.
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two Koreas. 22 Orascom, an Egyptian company, began a mobile service partnership with the North Korean government in December 2011, and is enjoying a monopolistic position to meet communication demand of more
23
than 2 million cell phone users.
It is a well-known fact that North Koreans are now participating in
their own version of capitalism at more than 300 jangmadang,or markets
throughout the country. 24 Pyongyang sought to restructure its economy
through the measures of July 1, 2002, which allowed surplus production
over the quota assigned by the state. The government backtracked, however, when it felt the threat of burgeoning private initiatives. In November
2009, the North Korean government ordered the currency reform, whereby
old money was to be exchanged with new currency at the rate of 100 to I.
The policy was supplemented by a ban on use of foreign exchange and a
crackdown on markets.
This misguided attempt by the government to reassert itself failed,
however, as it caused hyperinflation and hoarding of Chinese yuan and U.S.
dollar. 25 In February 2010, the government allowed circulation of foreign
currency and opening of large markets again. Pyongyang henceforth implemented policies such as the June 28 measures in 2012 and the May 30
22. Construction started in June 2003, and was completed in October 2007. At the
end of December 2010, 121 enterprises maintained manufacturing facilities there, and
employed more than 46,000 North Korean workers. The industrial zone's turbulent history reflected the relationship between the two countries. The operation was suspended
or disrupted, with withdrawal of some or all of the South Korean workers from the
zone, after the sinking of Cheonan warship in March 2010, the bombing of Yeonpyeong
island in November 2010, and in April 2013 when Pyongyang's military threat reached
new heights. The operation was eventually restored after each incident, until it was
completely shut down after North's launch of a rocket in February 2016.
23. See Martyn Williams, Orascom has $422 million in cash in North Korea, N.
KOREA

TECH

(Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.northkoreatech.org/2013/12/16/orascom-

has-422-million-in-cash-in-north-korea; Over 2 Million N. Koreans Have Mobile
Phones, CHOSUN ILBO (ENG. ED.) (Aug. 5, 2013), http://english.choson.com/svc/news/
printContent.htmi.
24. Jangmadanginitially began as a small market where farmers sold extraneous
agricultural commodities and other goods. In the 1990s, however, people came to rely
on market to supplement the lower income they earned from state enterprises. Pyongyang officially recognized jonghapsijang (general market) after the measures of July 1,
2002. Today, food, shoes, clothes, electrical devices, and other sundry goods from
China, Japan, and South Korea are freely traded at the market. Sellers and purchasers
move far more efficiently than they ever did at state-owned enterprises.
25. Foreign currency is exchanged as de factor currency at markets, as residents
do not trust in the value of North Korean won. See James Pearson, North Korea'sBlack
Market Becoming the New Normal, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-northkorea-change-insight-idUSKCNOSN0320151029.
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measures in 2014, which permitted enterprises to keep a share of what they
produced after paying off the state.2 6 As will be explained below, DPRK
now is a scene of "a quiet revolution" where businesses are run by entrepre2
neurs with profit motives.
In North Korea, the political structure inherited from the Kim Il-sung
era is essentially intact. Kim Jong-un is the supreme commander, and the
WPK is the only political party with power. Unlike in other Stalinist countries, DPRK generated a dynasty with power transfer occurring within the
Kim family. The country as a whole is faring badly, and discontent is simmering underground, but Kim is audaciously wielding his power. The propaganda machine pumping out the personality cult of Great Leader and Dear
Leader is still in high gear. People may whisper in private their frustration
with the government, but a revolt, small or large, would be ruthlessly put
down.
With its relatively well-educated labor force, location in the hub of
East Asia, plentiful underground resources, a track record of industrial development, 28 and the populace already learning the ropes of capitalism,
North Korea has a potential to lift itself out of underdevelopment. Political
liberalization would empower it to reduce the poverty rate, upgrade outdated infrastructure, become better integrated with the global economy, and
join other emerging nations in achieving fast economic growth.

Ill.

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LEGALLY GUARANTEED IN
NORTH KOREA

Protection of human rights may be a culturally relative value, 29 but
DPRK is a signatory to many international human rights treaties. Pyongyang joined the UN on September 17, 1991, together with South Korea, and
is therefore a party to the UN Charter, which encourages respect for fundamental rights. North Korea also complied with international protocols such

26. The DPRK state allowed an independent accounting system (dongnip
chaesanje) beginning in the 1960s, which gave entities some control over their own
operations. Such policies were limited, however, as the country remained essentially
centrally planned at least until the 1980s. See Bukhan jisik sajeon, supra note 17.
27. See Stephen Evans, A Quiet Revolution in North Korea, BBC

NEWS

(Jan. 14,

2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30812237.
28. Until the early 1990s, the North Korean government periodically announced
multi-year development plans to increase production of coal, automobiles, machines,
steel, and other commodities. As was the case in USSR and other communist countries,
Pyongyang successfully industrialized the country in the 1960s.
29. See, e.g.,

AMARTYA SEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES

(1997).
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as submitting reports to UN committees under the International Covenant
30
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other treaties.
TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES SIGNED BY
NORTH KOREA'
Treaty

Joined in

International Covenant on Economic.

September 1981

Entered iinto force
in
December 1981

ICCPR

September 1981

December 1981

Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and

November 1984

February 1985

Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment Of the Crime of Genocide

anuary 1989

May 1989

Convention on the Rights of the Child

September 1990

October 1990

Convention on Elimination of
Discrimination against Women

February 2001

March 2001

Social, and Cultural Rights

Crimes Against Humanity

'CHAN-(;YU KIM AND GYU-CHANG Lai.

BUKHAN GUKI'IlWO

YFONKU (Study on International Laws in

North Korea) (2009).

The DPRK government itself officially espouses the value of human
rights. As a matter of fact, North Korea was founded on the principle of
welfare and egalitarianism under proletariat ideals. Article 65 of the socialist constitution proclaims that citizens shall enjoy equal rights in all fields
of national social life. 31 Kim Il-sung was said to have wimin-icheon as his
motto, which decrees that a head of a state should uphold his subjects as
heaven. Kim's mission apparently was to build a strong nation which would
take it upon itself to look after people's well-being.

30. See Bo-hyuk Suh, Controversies over North Korean Human Rights in South
Korea Society, 31 ASIAN PERSP. 23, 25 (2007).
31. DONG HAN KIM, MIGUK-Ul BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP-GWA
BUKHAN-UI
IN'GWON-GWANRYEON-BEOPJE-UI BIGYO-BUNSEOK (Comparative Analysis of North Ko-

rea Human Rights Act in the U.S. and the Human Rights-Related Laws in North Korea)
(2005).
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TABLE

2. BASIC RIGHTS OF CITIZENS UNDER THE SOCIALIST
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA

Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

66
67
68
69
72
73
74
75
77

Rights to vote, to be elected
Freedom of assembly and press
Freedom of faith
Right to a legal action
Right to free medical care
Right to education
Freedom of science, literature, and art
Freedom of residence and travel
Women's equality

IV.
A.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

United Nations

Repatriation of North Korean refugees, malnutrition, political imprisonment, and other plights have been a recurrent question at the UN. The
first resolution at the UN against human rights violations in North Korea
was at the Sub-commission on Human Rights in August 1997.32 Since
2006, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions on North Korean
human rights at every session. 33 In March 2013, the UN organized the Commission of Inquiry (COI) to probe into DPRK's human rights record. COI
spent several months conducting public hearings with more than 80 North
Korean refugees and other witnesses in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington. In February 2014, the commission published one of the most comprehensive reports on North Korean human rights. The report describes
some of the inhumanity perpetrated by the DPRK government, and advised
that the Security Council refer the situation to the International Criminal
34
Court (ICC), or an ad hoc tribunal at the UN.
32.

DEUG

KEE

AHN,

KUKJE-SAHOE-WA

BUKHAN-IN'GWON:

HYEONHWANG,

(International Community and North Korean Human Rights: Current Status, Controversies, and Tasks) (2011).
33. In July 2004, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Vitit Muntarbhorn,
a human rights scholar, as a rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. Muntarbhorn's
request to be allowed entry into the country and have meetings with DPRK officials
was repeatedly denied, however.
34. Michael Kirby, a former Australian judge who chaired the COI, compared the
violence committed by Pyongyang to that by the Nazi Germany and Pol Pot's Cambodia. Peter Walker, North Korea Human Rights Abuses Resemble Those of the Nazis,
Says UN Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/feb/I 7/north-korea-human-rights-abuses-united-nations/.
JAENGJEOM, GWAJE
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3.

RESOLUTIONS AT

UN

DENOUNCING HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 2

General Assembly
60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th
Commission on Human Rights
59th, 60th, 61st
Human Rights Council
7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 22nd, 25th, 28th
U.N. North Korea Human Rights Issues Discussion Database, MINISTRY oF FORIIGN AFFAIRS,
http://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/hunanrights/diplomacy/northkorea/index.jsp?menu=M-30 70_70&tab
menu=T_2 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
2-See

In November 2014, the Third Committee of the General Assembly
adopted a resolution which also recommended referring the situation to an
ICC trial. A trial at the ICC would be momentous in that it would be closely
covered by media from around the world. The indictment and the conviction would be extremely embarrassing to those found guilty, even if they
cannot physically be arrested and imprisoned, and the news would reach
35
ears of North Koreans, too.
B.

United States
1. NKHRA in the United States

The George W. Bush administration challenged Pyongyang, a member
of the axis of evil, on all controversies including human rights, and the
legislations reflected such presidential position. In October 2002, Senator
Sam Brownback presented the North Korean Refugee Relief Act (NKRRA), which allowed those fleeing North Korea to seek asylum protection
in the U.S. Brownback introduced it again on June 25, 2003, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War in 1950, and the bill passed both chambers a month later.
In November of the same year, Brownback and Evan Bayh felt a need
for a law with a broader coverage, and came up with the North Korean
Freedom Act (NKFA). Representative Jim Leach initiated a bill with the
35. South Koreans ordinarily refer to people living in DPRK as "North Korean
residents" (bukhan jumin), as opposed to "North Korean nationals" or "North Korean
citizens." Under Article 3 of the South Korean constitution, the territory of the Republic
of Korea consists of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands. DAEHANMINKUK
HEONBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (S. Kor.). The term "North Korean residents" implies
that North Korea is part of South Korea as opposed to another country.
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same name in the House. In March 2004, Leach introduced the North Korean Human Rights Act, a modified version of the NKRRA, and the bill
passed the Senate and the House in September and October 2004, respec36
tively, with bipartisan support.
TABLE

4.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NORTH KOREA HUMAN

RIGHTS ACT IN THE UNITED STATES3
November 2003

Senators Brownback and Bayh proposed the North Korean
Freedom Act.

November 2003

Representative Jim Leach introduced the North Korean
Freedom Act.

March 2004

16 congresspersons led by Leach unveiled the North Korea
Human Rights Act, which modified the bill which Leach
himself had initiated

The bill passed the International Relations Committee in
the House by unanimous vote.
July 2004
September 2004

The House passed the bill by voice vote.
The Senate modified the House bill, and ratified it by
unanimous vote.

October 2004

The House passed the modified Senate bill, again with
unanimous vote.

October 2004

President Bush signed the bill.
President Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights
Reauthorization Act.
President Obama signed the
Korean Human Rights
Reauthorization Act, extendingNorth
its effectiveness until 2017.

3

Prepared by Dong Han Kim.

The U.S. NKHRA contains findings on the human rights situation in
North Korea.3 7 Its programs relate to support for democracy programs, 38
radio transmission to North Korea, 39 appointment of an envoy on human
rights,40 monitoring assistance to North Korea, 41 and protection of North
42
Korean refugees.
On the international front, the law advocates a regional human rights
dialogue, 43 requests the Chinese government to give UN workers "unim36. The role of North Korea Freedom Coalition among other religious human
rights groups was substantial in gathering support for the law.
37. North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 4011, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004).
38. Id. § 102.
39. Id. § 103.
40. Id. § 107.
41. Id. § 202.
42. Id. §§ 301-03.
43. Id. § 106.
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peded access" to North Koreans in China,44 and makes recommendations
for the UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees. 45 Government budget is
allocated for human rights programs 46 and promotion of freedom of information. 47 The law further directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit annual reports to congressional committees. 4"
The law was reauthorized in 2008 and in 2012 to extend duration of the
measures set forth in the 2004 Act.
2.

Other Laws in the United States

In addition to the law on North Korean human rights, Congress passed
a number of other legislations on international human rights. We will survey those laws below, to put NKHRA in the U.S. and South Korea in
49
perspective.
a.

Cuban Democracy Act

Popularly known as Torricelli Act, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
mandates economic sanctions on the Cuban government. Among such disciplinary measures are sanctions against countries aiding Cuba,s° prohibitions on entry into a port in the U.S. by a ship with Cuban interest, 5 1 and
limitations on remittances to Cuba. 52 The law also allowed Washington to
support individuals and organizations working for peaceful democratic
change in Cuba. 53 The law does not prohibit the54 donation of food,
medicines, and other medical supplies to the country.

44. Id. § 304(a)(1).
45. Id. §§ 304(a)(2)(5).
46. Id. § 102.
47. Id. § 104.

48. Id. § 305.
49.

YONG-CHEON

KIM, MIKUK-UM

2004-NYEON BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP JEJEONG

UIMl-WA HANBANDO PYEONGHWA BANG'AN MOSAEK: JIPKWON 2-KI BUSI HAENGJEONG-

(A search for plan about the
a North Korean Human
of
establishing
the
meaning
peace of the Korean peninsula and
Rights Act of 2004).
50. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 6003(b), 106 Stat.
2575 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. ch. 69, § 6003(b) (1993)).
51. Id. § 6005(b).
52. Id. § 6005(c).
53. Id. § 6004(g).
54. Id. §§ 6004(b), (c), (e), (f).
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Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity Act

After the Cuban government shot down two aircrafts operated by
Brothers to the Rescue, an organization assisting Cuban refugees, in 1996,
Washington countered with the Cuban Liberty Democratic Solidarity Act,
also known as the Helms-Burton Act. Helms-Burton's provisions concerned
(1) expanding international sanctions against the Fidel Castro regime,5 5 (2)
catalyzing the transition to democracy in Cuba, 56 (3) protecting rights of
U.S. nationals, whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government, 57
and (4) expelling from the U.S. an alien who confiscated or trafficked property of U.S. nationals. 58 The law allows filing of an action in the U.S. for
wrongful deprivation of property. 59 It further declares that the sanctions
cannot be lifted until a democratically elected government is installed in
60
Cuba.
The law's aggressiveness provoked protests from other countries. The
EU considered referring the U.S. to a panel at the World Trade Organization over the extra-territorial application of the law. In its disapproval of the
law, the U.K. government sent Baroness Symons, Under Secretary of State,

to Cuba in October 1998, and urged its European partners to act against the
law. 6 1 The General Assembly adopted resolutions every year since the early
1990s requesting the U.S. end its blockade against Cuba, and requesting the
62
adoption of resolutions continued after the enactment of Helms-Burton.
c.

Iran Democracy Act (IDA)

IDA, legislated in 2003, is a brief law with just four sections. It sponsors democratic initiatives in Iran such as Radio Farda programming, and
distributes grants to organizations putting together media materials for rule
63
of law in Iran.

55. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, tit. 1, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. tit. 1 ((1996) [hereinafter
Helms-Burton Act].
56. Id. tit. 2.
57. Id. tit. 3.
58. Id. tit. 4.
59. Id. § 302(a)(4).
60. Id. §§ 201(14), 204(c).
61. MICK HILLYARD & VAUGHNE MILLER, CUBA AND THE HELMS-BURTON
29 (1998).
62. See generally id.
63. Iran Democracy Act of 2003, S. 1082, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).

ACT
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Iraq Liberation Act (ILA)

ILA, ratified in 1998, directs the president to select a democratic opposition group against Saddam Hussein. 64 It further provides for a war crimes
tribunal 65 and supports a transition to democracy in the country. 66 Explicitly
authorized are military spending and a subsidy of up to $97 million to fund
insurgent groups.

67

TABLE 5. CONTENTS OF NKHRA IN THE UNITED STATES, HELMS4
BURTON, IDA AND ILA
Regime change
5
* NKHRA: Reunification of the Korean peninsula under democracy
* Helms-Burton: Driving out the Fidel Castro government
* IDA: Achieving transparent and complete democracy'
• ILA: Overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime7
Subversive operation
* NKHRA: Grants to organizations promoting "democracy, rule of law, and the
development of a market economy" in North Korea'
- Helms-Burton: Support for democratic groups in Cuba"
- ILA: Military appropriation of up to $97,000,000"'
Economic sanction
* Helms-Burton: Blockade against Cuba, limitation on foreign companies doing business
with Cuba
Anti-regime media
* NKHRA: Goal of broadcasting 12 hours
a day to North Korea"
2
Marti'
" Helms-Burton: Television
3
" IDA: Radio Farda
* ILA: Grant to organizations for radio and television broadcasting
4
Prepared by Dong Han Kim.
5
North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 401 I, 108th Cong. § 4(5) (2004).
'Iran
Democracy Act of 2003, S. 1082. 108th Cong. § 3(1) (2003).
7
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
'North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. H.R. 4011, 108th Cong. § 102(a) (2004).
'Helms Burton Act § 109.
'Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655. 105th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(B) (1998).
"North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 401 I, 108th Cong. § 103(a) (2004).
' 2Helms Burton Act § 107.
"3Iran Democracy Act of 2003. S. 1082, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
'Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1998).

The enactment of these laws predictably intensified anti-American
sentiments in target countries. Washington has been in conflict with these

countries long before these laws were promulgated. The legislations paral64.
65.
66.
67.

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
Id. § 6.
Id. §§ 4, 7.
Id. § 4.
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leled existing U.S. policies toward those states, and must be understood in
68
the context of such political dynamics.
C.

Japan

The official title of the North Korean Human Rights Act in Japan is the
Act to Address Abduction and Other Issues Relating to Human Rights Infringement by the North Korean Government. 69 The legislation with eight
clauses is of narrower scope when compared to U.S. law. The law addresses
repatriation of abductees, an issue which had long frustrated Japan's relationship with DPRK. 70 It prescribes protection of North Korean refugees,
and cooperation with domestic and international entities, 7 1 establishes the
Korean human rights week, 72 and instructs the government to submit to the
National Diet 73 an annual report on state efforts to resolve the abduction
74
issue.
There have also been other endeavors by the Japanese government. In
March 2014, Japan and the EU jointly submitted to the UN Human Rights
Council a draft resolution proposing referral of the situation in North Korea
to the ICC. 75 Tokyo also enforced sanctions on North Korea such as an
embargo and travel ban, which went through a cycle of tightening and soft76
ening based on the relationship between the two countries.
68. Bert Hoffmann, The Helms-Burton Law and Its Consequencesfor Cuba, the
United States and Europe(1998), http:/lasa.international.pitt.edulasa98/hoffmann.pdf.;
KIM, supra note 52.
69. Racchi-mondai sono-hoka kita-chousen-toukyoku-niyoru jinken-sin'gaimondai-heno taisho-ni kansuru houritsu. The law passed the House of Representatives
and the House of Councillors in June 2006. A revised law passed both chambers in June
2007.
70. Tokyo maintains that North Korean government seized hundreds of Japanese
civilians in the 1970s and 1980s, to use them in training North Korean spies in Japanese
language and culture. Pyongyang and Tokyo disagree over whether the DPRK government freed all those who had been kidnapped.
71. Outline of North Korea Human Rights Act art. 6, N. KOREA HUM. RTS. RES.
CTR., https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Japan-NKHRA-2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2016).
72. Id. art. 4.
73. Kokkai.
74. Outline of North Korea Human Rights Act art. 6, supra note 85.
75. Hum. Rts. Council, Human rights situations that require the Council's attention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/L.17 (March 26, 2014). The draft resolution was subsequently approved at the General Assembly in December 2014.
76. For example, after Pyongyang announced creation of a committee to investigate the kidnappings in July 2014, the Japanese government eased restriction on travel
and money transfer. Reiji Yoshida, Economic sanctionsagainst North Korea partially
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European Union

The EU, one of the donors to DPRK, also tried to engage North Korea
in human rights. As mentioned above, the EU sponsored resolutions in the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and adopted autonomous resolutions. EU also held "political dialogues" with DPRK throughout the 2000s. The release of the COI report prompted Pyongyang to act as
it dispatched Kang Seok-ju, WPK secretary, to Brussels in September 2014.
It also invited Stavros Lambrinidis, the human rights representative of the
EU, to the country.
Have such transnational processes generated tangible results? International treaties depend largely on voluntary compliance, and resolutions do
not have a legally binding force. Even an ICC decision convicting Kim
Jong-un would not be enforceable, unless Kim voluntarily subjects himself
to the authority of the ICC. The effect of economic and other sanctions is
questionable 77, as Pyongyang continues to ignore international outcries
against the country. 78 Short of throwing out the North Korean regime with
military power, there does not appear to be much the international community can do about DPRK's human rights. What difference would NKHRA
make, now that it became a law in South Korea?
V.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND POLITICAL BICKERING

Hannara Party and its successor, Saenuri Party, proposed bills at every
Assembly since the 17th National Assembly. Representative Hwang Jin-ha
was the main sponsor of the legislations at the 17th, 18th, and 19th Assembly, and Yun Sang-hyeon, at the 18th and 19th Assembly. Jo Myeonglifted, JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 4, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/04/nation
al/politics-diplomacy/sanctions-loosened-agai nst-north-korea/#.VdvF I33cDFk.
77. For example, Executive Order 1355 1, which was signed after sinking of Cheonan navy ship in March 2010, broadened restrictions under Executive Order 13466 of
June 2008 on money laundering, arms trade, and other "illicit and deceptive activities in
international markets." Exec. Order No. 13,551, 75 C.F.R. § 169 (2010). Refer to the
Treasury website for a list of sanctions against the country. Resource Center: North
Korea Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
78. In April 2016, Ri Su Yong, North Korea's foreign minister, said his country
would halt its nuclear tests only if South Korea stops military exercise with the U.S.
Security Council Resolution 2270 gained approval by China and Russia, North Korea's
traditional allies, but it is uncertain how strictly the two countries will enforce the sanctions. More importantly, the sanctions won't serve their purpose if they cause hardships
to ordinary individuals in North Korea, the very subjects which the sanctions are designed to help.
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cheol, a North Korean refugee himself, offered a bill in the 19th Assembly.
After the submission, however, the bills gathered dust on the shelf of the
legislature, except when they became a subject of sporadic deliberation.7 9
NKHRA somewhat gained impetus with the publication of the COI report,
but it was Pyongyang's missile testing in early 2016, which catalyzed the
bill's passage in March 2016.
In South Korea, liberals are traditionally pro-North, while conservatives take a hard line. A bill taking Pyongyang on human rights therefore is
bound to be a lot more contentious than a bill on inter-Korean cooperation
or a law publishing a unified dictionary, for instance. Resistance had been
fierce, as when Democratic Party80 put NKHRA on the list of bills it vowed
to obstruct during the interim Assembly session in December 2008.
5
TABLE 6. LEAD SPONSORS OF NKHRA1

17th Assembly (June 5, 2004 - May 29, 2008)
June 2005

Hwang Jin-ha (Hannara)

August 2005

Kim Mun-su (Hannara)
18th Assembly (May 30, 2008 - May 29, 2012)

July 2008

Hwang Wu-yeo (Hannara)

July 2008

Hwang Jin-ha (Hannara)

November 2008

Hong II-pyo (Hannara)

December 2008

Yun Sang-hyeon (Hannara)

19th Assembly (May 30, 2012 - May 29, 2016)

5

June 2012

Yun Sang-hyeon (Saenuri)

June 2012

Hwang Jin-ha (Saenuri)

August 2012

Lee In-je (AUP)

September 2012

Jo Myeong-cheol (Saenuri)

March 2013

Sim Yun-jo (Saenuri)

November 2014

Kim Yeong-wu (Saenuri)

YOUNG-SUN CHUNG, BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP"-E I)AHAN IN'GWONJEOK GOCHAL

Korean Human Rights Act from the Human Rights Perspective);

ISS'EO KUKHOE-YIOKHAI JEGO-BANG'AN YFONKU (Reconsideration
bly's Role in the Implementation of Policy towards North Korea).
SUHAENG-

(Study on the North

JONG-su KiM, DAUHUK-JEONGCHAhK
of

the National Assem-

79. The bills lapsed when the term of the respective Assembly came to an end.
80. Minju-dang.
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TABLE

7.

LEAD SPONSORS OF THE BILLS PROPOSED BY THE
LIBERAL PARTIES
18th Assembly

September 2008,
September 2009
September 2009

Song Min-sun (Democratic Party)
Kang Ki-gap (Democratic Labor Party)

June 2011

Kim Dong-cheol (Democratic Party)
19th Assembly

November 2012

Jeong Cheong-rae (Democratic United Party) 1

July 2013

Yun Hu-deok (Democratic Party)

September 2013

In Jae-keun (Democratic Party)

November 2013
April 2014

7
Sim Jae-kwon (Democratic Party)
Sim Jae-kwon (NPAD)

'The bill concerned providing humanitarian assistance to infants in North Korea.
"The bill was on helping pregnant women and children in the country.
TABLE

8.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTIES THAT PROPOSED

NKHRA

8
Hannara Party'

Hannara Party, established in November 1997 by the merger of two parties, was the major
right-wing party. It was a minority in the 17th Assembly when it won 121 seats in the 2004
election. It became the majority party in the 18th Assembly, after it picked up 153 seats."
2
Saenuri Party '1
Hannara Party changed the name to Saenuri Party in February 2012. It won the majority in
the April 2012 election, with 152 seats.
2
Advancement and Unification Party '
22
Right-leaning AUP, established in February 2008 as Liberty Forward Party, acquired 18
seats in the 2008 election. The party changed its name to AUP in May 2012, after it only
captured 5 seats in the election a month earlier. The party was eventually absorbed into
Saenuri in November 2012.

'nannara-dang.
''The National Assembly members consist of (I) those elected in their district and (2) those who did not
run in a district, but are nominated by a party (birve daepyo) for nation-wide representation. A voter
casts two votes, (1) one for a district candidate and (2) the other for a party which he favors for national
representation. National representation seats are distributed in proportion to the number of votes the
party won therefor. The National Assembly determines the number of the total legislative seats. The
election in 2008 produced 299 representatives, 245 elected in the districts and 54 nation-wide, whereas
the April 2012 election yielded 300 representatives, 246 elected in the districts, 54 nation-wide. Under
Article 109 of Kukhoe-beop (National Assembly Act), the proceedings generally are to be voted on in
the presence of a majority of all incumbent National Assembly members, and by a vote of a majority of
the members present. The number of incumbents often falls below the number at the beginning of the
Assembly, due to removal of members on disciplinary grounds such as violation of election law.
2-Saenuri-dang.
21
Seonjin-tong 'il-dang.
22jayu-seonjin-dang.
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9. THE LIBERAL PARTIES THAT OFFERED
HUMANITARIAN BILLS
23

Uri Party
Uri Party, established in November 2003 with members from an array of parties, became the
majority party in the 17th Assembly after it won 152 seats. Most members of the party
joined the United Democratic Party24 in February 2008.
Democratic Party
There have been several political parties in South Korea, with the title of Democratic Party.
The party which used the name in the 18th Assembly was founded in February 2008 with
union of two parties, under the name of United Democratic Party. The party secured 81 seats
in the election in April 2008, and changed its name to Democratic Party in July of the same
year. The party was dissolved in December 2011 when it joined with the Citizens Unity
Party 25 and others to form Democratic United Party. 26 Democratic United Party won 127
seats in the 19th National Assembly election. The old name was recycled when the party
changed itself to Democratic Party in May 2013.
27
New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD)
NPAD was founded in March 2014, as Democratic Party united with the political force of
An Cheol-su, an IT entrepreneur-turned-politician. NPAD was renamed The Minjoo Party of
Korea 8 in December 2015, after An and his followers left NPAD.
29
Democratic Labor Party
Democratic Labor Party was an ultra-left party founded in January 2000. It won 5 seats in
the 2008 election, and was integrated into the United Progressive Party 30 in December 2011.
23

Yeolfin-uri-dang.

24

Tonghap-minju-dang.
25Simin-tonghap-dang.
26
Minju-tonghap-dang.
2
TSaejeongchi-minju-yeonhap.
28
Deobuleo minjoo-dang.
29
Minju-nodong-dang.
°Tonghap-jinbo-dang.

A.

17th National Assembly

Presidency changed hands from liberal Roh Moo-hyun to conservative
Lee Myung-bak in February 2008 during the 17th National Assembly. In
the wake of the enactment of NKHRA in the U.S. and Japan and the nuclear
experiment by Pyongyang in October 2006, voices were raised at the National Assembly to promulgate a similar law in South Korea. Representative
Hwang Jin-ha, a former military officer, first introduced NKHRA in June
2005, broadly patterned on NKHRA in the U.S. Hwang's bill was followed
by a legislation by Representative Kim Mun-su two months later. Kim's bill
was scheduled for discussion at the committee a year after submission in
September 2006, but Hwang's bill was never even scheduled. The strong
stance of Uri Party, which was the majority party at the time, against the
bills prevented them from making their way out of FAUC.
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18th National Assembly

In the 18th session, conservative Hannara Party acquired the majority
of seats in the National Assembly, and a legislative environment was created more conducive to the passage of NKIRA. Four congresspersons from
Hannara served as chief sponsors of NKHRA. The bills by the legislators
were adjusted and combined into one representative act, which was approved at FAUC in February 2010.81 The bill was subsequently sent to Legislation and Judiciary Committee (LJC),8 2 but could not sail over political
gridlock.
The liberal parties, while acknowledging the severity of human rights
violations in North Korea, produced their own humanitarian laws. The bills
by Representative Song Min-sun were focused on amending the existing
law on supporting North Korean escapees, while the legislation by Kang
Ki-gap centered on sending rice to the North. These proposed laws, however, omitted institutions such as the committee and foundation to hold Pyongyang accountable.
C.

19th National Assembly

In November 2014, the FAUC assigned the bills from Saenuri and
NPAD respectively, to its subcommittee responsible for reviewing bills.
Kim Yeong-wu was the primary sponsor of the bill which consolidated a
number of bills put forth by his Saenuri colleagues. Sim Jae-kwon, a NPAD
lawmaker, originated the bill from his party. The Sim Jae-kwon bill was
viewed as embracing the centrist position within the party. It went so far as
to label promotion of North Korean human rights as Seoul's responsibility,
require the South Korean government to carry out a human rights dialogue,
and create an advisory board on human rights dialogue, a council on aid,
and a human rights information center. The bill, however, did not feature
human rights foundation, policy, or data center, and does not ask for transparency from Pyongyang on its distribution of donated goods.
The Assembly eventually passed NKHRA on March 2, 2016, with 212
in favor, 24 in abstention of 236 in presence. On February 10, the last day
of the Lunar New Year holiday, the Assembly issued, by 243 in favor and 5
in abstention, a resolution denouncing the DPRK's rocket launch on February 7. The bill received approval of both FAUC and LJC on February 26,
81. The bill received 14 votes from members of Hannara and 2 votes from Liberty
Forward Party. Democratic Party members had exited the room in protest before voting
commenced.
82. Beopje-sabeop-wiwonhoe.
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after Saenuri and The Minjoo leaderships struck a deal.83 The passed law
accommodated most of the provisions of the bills previously introduced at
the Assembly, after only a minor dispute on phrasing of a provision. Such
an accelerated pace is extraordinary, given the sluggish progress it had been
making since the mid-2000s. The political climate was such that parties,
left- and right-wing, had no choice but to rage at DPRK's reckless rocket
launch earlier in the year.
D.

PartisanPolitics

The challenges NKHRA faced at the Assembly should be understood
in the context of its legislative politics. North Korea provides an ideological
and political battleground between liberals and conservatives in South Korea. Labor activists, socialists, and others on the far left of the political
spectrum do not opt for any inquiry into human rights situation in DPRK.
Conversely, North Korean defector associations are among the most active
proponents of NKHRA. Such disputes were replicated at the National Assembly, and the stalemate has been very difficult to break through. NKHRA
was able to reach LJC in the 18th Assembly. LJC assesses legal technicalities of a proposed act, after policy impacts are discussed at a primary-level

committee. NKHRA should therefore have been forwarded to the plenary
session in due course after the bill's constitutionality and other matters are
reviewed, but such submission did not happen in the 18th Assembly. 84
Rightist coalitions host seminars, workshops, and rallies to insist on
ratification. According to conservatives, it is ironic for leftist liberals, who
claim to champion human rights, to attack NKHRA. Some of the
lawmakers who disagreed with NKHRA had been persecuted for protesting
against military rule in South Korea in the 1980s. Now they fought against
the law that seeks to banish the tyranny in the north. Right wingers further
stressed that the humanitarian bills prepared by NPAD represent yet another
effort to aid Pyongyang unconditionally without first trying to have it answer for its misconduct.

83. The interim session itself, during which NKHRA was enacted, was marked by
more than 190 hours of filibustering by The Minjoo, as the party protested at Terror
Prevention Act (tereo bangji-beop), which the party argued would be used by government intelligence to infringe on civil liberty. NKHRA itself was classified as one of the
"non-controversial" bills, as the parties generally consented to its passage.
84. Namhan-ui bukhan-in'gwon-beop nonran (Controversies surrounding the

North Korean Human Rights Act in South Korea), RADIO FREE ASIA (Jul. 5, 2011),
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/ad81 aeO8c99d-d480c5b4c90db2c8b2e4/
askquestion-070520111701 00.html.
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NPAD's position, on the other hand, was that any solution to the
human rights problems in North Korea must be predicated on accepting
DPRK's sovereignty. Lee Hae-chan, as a Democratic United Party legislator in June 2012, contended that NKHRA constitutes "diplomatic discourtesy" toward the North. Pak Ji-won, as he was stepping down from one of
the key positions at the Democratic Party in May 2011, professed his pride
in having thwarted NKHRA at the Assembly. NPAD further said that NKHRA constitutes a veiled attempt by the right-wing government to channel
more funding to organizations with similar ideological leanings, and would
not make much contribution to human rights in North Korea.
In January 2015, Yu Ki-jun, a Sanueri lawmaker and a chairman of
FAUC, offered that for NKHRA to move forward, a top-level body between
the parties needed to be formed. Such body will help sidestep political differences, and enable the legislation, he argued. The disparities between the
two sides have not diminished, however, and a deliberative session at
FAUC over NKHRA generally went no further than confirming again the
85
unyielding grounds of the two sides.
The legislative procedures such as submission ex officio by the Assembly chairman or through "fast track" have been suggested, but were not well
received. In 2011, Hannara Party entertained the option of sending the bill
to the plenary session ex officio by the power of the National Assembly
chairman. 86 The fast-track provision of Article 85-2 of the National Assembly Act also specifies a mechanism for bringing a bill automatically to the
plenary session. 87 In January 2015, however, Yu Ki-jun argued against designation of NKHRA for expeditious processing. At the time, FAUC had 14
Saenuri Party members and 9 NPAD members. Saenuri could therefore
have set NKHRA up for expeditious processing, if all its members at the
committee voted in favor. Even if NKHRA secured such designation and
85. In 2011, Democratic Party contemplated the possibility of combining contents
of bills from both Hannara and Democratic Party. Hannara did not accept it, however,
on the ground that such integration will interfere with core substance of its bills.
86. Kim Mu-seong, buk-in'gwon-beop jeil keorowoe, jikkwon sangieong gomin

(Kim Mu-seong said NKHRA deeply troubled him, and he was mulling submission ex
officio), DAILY NK, http://www.dailynk.comkorean/read.php?catald=nk02600&num
=90281 (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
87. If a committee other than LJC fails to finish the examination of an agenda
designated for expeditious disposition within 180 days from the date of such designation, the agenda is automatically referred to LJC. Similarly, if LJC does not complete
examination within 90 days of the designation, it automatically goes to the plenary
session. To gain such designation, an agenda needs affirmative votes of 3/5 of all incumbent National Assembly members or at least 3/5 of all incumbent National Assembly members of the competent committee.
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arrived at LJC after 180 days at FAUC, however, there was no guarantee
that the bill would again be reserved for accelerated processing, as the
membership at LJC was more evenly divided between the left- and right88
wing parties in the 19th Assembly.
Yu claimed that there was not enough time to fast-track the bill before
the National Assembly election in April 2016. The majority party was concerned that such legal maneuvers would induce the counterparty to respond
in kind, and jeopardize bargaining between them regarding other more politically crucial items. NKHRA therefore became a victim of partisan politics, and a genuine discourse on human rights was hard to come by.
Likewise, the regulatory framework is already in place in South Korea,
touching upon much of the important DPRK-related agenda. Civic alliances
working with North Korean refugees and on human rights are already receiving state subsidies. The Ministry of Unification is coordinating efforts
with respect to the transmission of information to North Koreans, international collaboration, exchange, education, and so on. The ministry and other
domestic and international organizations are drawing together data on
human rights violations. Any flaws in those activities can be remedied
under the existing legal structure, and for practical purpose, the ratification
and enforcement of NKHRA are not necessary for those endeavors to
continue.
At the same time, the provisions of NKHRA which were not found in
existing laws, such as those creating the human rights foundation and committee, were not perceived as having any pragmatic effect. Equally important, NKHRA fell in legislative priority for both the ruling party and the
opposition, even though their rhetoric indicated otherwise. Assembly members did not wish to expend their limited political capital on NKHRA,
whose effect was deemed to be largely symbolic. They are motivated to
first tackle bills which directly deal with domestic matters. NKHRA therefore struggled to receive attention from otherwise busy politicians.
VI.
A.

PROVISIONS

What NKHRA Does Not Involve

NKHRA is a domestic law with a transnational aspect. It is not an
international treaty entered into by Seoul and Pyongyang, and it does not
have a binding force on North Korea. Although the law has profound implications for inter-Korean relations, extensive discussion thereof or a fact88. As of August 2015, LJC was composed of 8 Saenuri and 7 NPAD lawmakers
and one leftist Justice Party (Jeongui-dang)member.
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finding provision which explicitly disparages Pyongyang is absent. Extraterritorial application is not an issue, since it does not refer the situation to a
domestic or international judicial body, impose an economic or military
ban, or make demands of Pyongyang. It does not outline a scheme for a
political or regime change, and no government budget is set aside for a
dissident group in DPRK. 89 In that regard, NKHRA is less intrusive than
some of the multilateral resolutions or international human rights laws in
the U.S.
B.

What it Enumerates

NKHRA enacted on March 2, 2016 integrates most of the common
contents in the previously proposed bills. 90 Laws made by the National Assembly only offer general policy direction. Actual implementation is also
contingent on subordinate decrees, as well as on supervision by the Unification Ministry and other bureaus. We nonetheless should evaluate NKHRA's
major subject matters for their regulatory and political implication.
1.

Basic Plan for North Korean Human Rights, the Human Rights
Rapporteur, the Advisory Board, and the Foundation

NKHRA provides for the advisory board, 91 the foundation, 92 and the
94
rapporteur. 93 It specifies the composition of the advisory board and re97
sponsibilities, 95 operation 96 and governance of the foundation. It also di98
rects Unification Ministry to formulate a basic and an enforcement plan.
These institutions will be charged with identifying ways to bring about ad89. Anti-regime organizations do not exist in North Korea in any event.
90.

SEUNG SHIN LEE, BUKHAN-IN'GWON

GWA JAENGJEOM

GWANRYEON-BEOP'AN

JUYO-NAEYONG-

(North Korean Human Rights Bill: The Main Content and Rising

Controversies).
91. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop (North Korea Human Rights Act) art. 5 (2016), http:/f
likms.assembly.go.kr/nfilegate/servlet/FileGate','AECC6A6E-563F-06A2-B38B332B35C3ECF4',' I'.
92. Id. art. 10.
93. Id. art. 9(2). The bills lead-sponsored by Yun Sang-hyeon, Hwang Jin-ha, Lee
In-je, and Jo Myeong-cheol in the 19th Assembly all had the advisory board, the basic
plan, and the foundation.
94. Id. art. 5(2).
95. Id. art. 10(3).
96. Id. art. I1.
97. Id. art. 12.
98. Id. art. 6(2).
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vancement in human rights, probe actual conditions, conduct research, offer
education, and assist organizations.
2.

Human Rights Database

Earlier bills differed on whether North Korean human rights archive
should be kept at Ministry of Justice, 99 National Human Rights Commission,100 or a North Korean human rights foundation. The enacted law places
it at Unification Ministry. 0 1 Nobody likes to have his wrongdoings memorialized in writing and disclosed to a third party. It is even more terrifying if
the information so gathered can subsequently be used against them. The
Unification Ministry and domestic and international non-governmental organizations are currently collecting the information, and the data bank
under NKHRA will reinforce such measures.
In general, testimony of the refugees and other informers cannot be
validated by an examination of actual situation, as international inspectors
are not permitted to enter the country, and the movement of aid workers is
heavily controlled. The testimonies may be erroneous or may even have
been falsified because of inaccurate memory, or bias of those who chose to
run away from North Korea under adverse circumstances.' 02 For now, however, secondary information is pretty much the extent of evidence we have.
The human rights archive, which was kept in Salzgitter in northern
Germany, 0 3 has been cited as a model. The documentation center opened in
October 1961, in reaction to construction of Berlin Wall by East Germany
two months earlier, with the mission of assembling evidence of human
rights violations by German Democratic Republic government. Information
was compiled on mistreatment of prisoners, disappearance of individuals,
and other incidents of oppression by the East German state. Approximately
42,000 cases of human rights infringement had been documented when the
record was handed over to criminal justice authorities after the unification,
and the center was shut down in 1992.10 4 The rationale was that Federal
99. Beopmu-bu.
100. Gukga-in'gwon-wiwonhoe.
101. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop, art. 13(1), supra note 121.

102. Those who temporarily stay abroad as diplomats, laborers, and so forth and
will eventually go back would not be forthcoming with unsavory occurrences inside
their own country.
103. ZentraleErfassungsstelleder Landesjustizverwaltungen(Central Archives of

the Federal Justice Department).
104. Bukhan-in'gwon-girok-bojonso "bukhan-in'gwon-baekseo" balgan (The

North Korean Human Rights Archive Publishes "North Korean Human Rights White
Paper"), RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/
hrjrights first/fe-mj- 10082013164250.html.
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Republic of Germany was responsible for prosecution of criminality in East
05
Germany too.
To hold the Nuremberg trials after World War 1I, the Allies combed
through a mountain of Nazi documents. For a legal action against North
Korean defendants, judges and prosecutors would also need to scrutinize
state records. The date center maintained by the South Korean government
will supply valuable supplementary evidence for this "transitional
justice. '' to6
3. Humanitarian Relief
A provision on transparency of foreign aid is also included. 07 Aid
should be given-but not unconditionally. The bill dictates that aid be supplied, distributed, and monitored under international standards. It should
first be dispensed to pregnant women, children, and other residents who
need it most, and should not be apportioned for military or other non-humanitarian purpose.
VII.
A.

WHAT

NKHRA CAN Do

Pressure on Pyongyang

One of the purposes of NKHRA is to alert Pyongyang that its acts of
iniquity won't go unpunished. The North Korean state does not remain
aloof when it is reproached by foreign observers. In fact, its reaction has
often been with outrage and hasty denial. North Korea lashed out at the
North Korea Human Rights Act in the U.S. It called the enactment of the
8
law an act of provocation and a product of U.S. hostilities against DPRK. 10
Pyongyang repeatedly denounced Seoul's attempt to legislate NKHRA, on
the grounds that such a law would only create conflict among Korean
people.
105. Elizabeth A. Lippitt, The Salzgitter Archives: West Germany's Answer to
East Germany's Human Rights Violations, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 156-60
(1986).
106. See PAOLO CAMMAROTA ET AL.,, LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA

(2007) (The legal memorandum by the U.S.-based

law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom explores legal approaches. The paper
discusses referral to the ICC and to the UN Security Council, collaboration with the UN
Human Rights Council, an action under an international treaty entered into by North
Korea, and a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Claims Act in the U.S.).
107. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop, art. 8, supra note 121.
108. See KIM, supra note 52.
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"Diplomatic counter-offensive" intensified after the COI report came
out. 09 Pyongyang answered the report with its own treatise, as well as a
109-pape report in September 2014 defending its human rights programs.1 0
In October 2014, North Korean officials met with Marzuki Darusman, an
Indonesian lawyer who was a member of the COI, for a possible invitation
of human rights officials to their country."'I In September 2014, Pyongyang
sent, for the first time in 15 years, a minister-level official to the UN General Assembly." 12 In November 2014, a week after the UN General Assembly adopted the UN resolution against Pyongyang, the North Korean
representative office at the UN conveyed to Secretary General Ban Ki3
moon its objection to the resolution."
DPRK's response shows that it does pay attention to how it is perceived by the global community. Pyongyang is also highly sensitive to Seoul's inter-Korean policy. Aid from South was drastically reduced after the
Yeongpyeong bombing in November 2010. A desperate North Korean government, however, needs all the grains, medications, and cements it can
obtain from other countries. Demand from other countries on human rights
therefore would be highly disconcerting.
B.

Changes Within DPRK

Reflection on North Korean human rights must be accompanied
through an analysis of changes afoot within the country. Perhaps in spite of
all its adversities, the North Korean state as it now stands will endure for
the foreseeable future. Kim Jong-un's DPRK will chug along for decades
before his successor takes over. News leaked out, however, hinting that
North Korea is a different place now. North Korea is at a critical juncture,
109. David Hawk, North Korea Responds to the UN Commission of Inquiry, 38
NORTH

(Oct. 16, 2014), http://38north.org/2014/10/dhawk 101614.

110. Adam Taylor, North Korea wrote a 53,558-word report on its human rights
record. The conclusion? It's pretty good, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/17/north-korea-wrote-a53558-word-report-on-its-human-rights-record-the-conclusion-its-pretty-good.
111. See Kwanwoo Jun, North Korea May Be Planning Human Rights Hoax,
WALL ST J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/10/28/north-korea
-may-be-planning-human-rights-hoax.
112. See Jung-chul Lee & Inwook Kim, Making Sense of North Korea, Foreign
Affairs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.comarticles/eastasia/2015-01-21/making-sense-north-korea.
113. Bukhan "In'gwon gyeoluian suyong mothanda," Ban chongjang-e seohan
(North Korea sent a letter to Secretary General Ban that it can't accept the human rights
resolution), YEONHAP NEWS, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/12/03/
0200000000AKR20141203005500072.HTML (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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as the authoritarian rule is hitting the limit of its power. The European communist bloc melted seemingly instantly. The same phenomenon can take
place in DPRK.
The North Korean state did not fall during the famine, largely due to a
blockage of information from the outside world. Now people are coming to
grasp that they have been deceived. Below is an overview of upheavals in
the country, which will have a direct impact on the future of the country and
its human rights situation.
1.

Gradual Erosion of State Control

The winds of change blowing in North Korea are making the dictatorship face a cold reality. The country has come a long way from when Kim
Il-sung, Kim Jong-un's grandfather, was in power. During the Cold War,
North Korea had a great number of those who were dedicated to national
autonomy and the juche creed." 4 Moreover, North Korea was surrounded
by other impoverished countries under autocracy. Unlike Eastern European
countries located a short distance from Western Europe, DPRK is stuck in a
corner of East Asia. The border between South and North is one of the most
fortified in the world, and the border with the People's Republic of China,
another socialist country, could be controlled. Moreover, it was easier to
brainwash citizens when the internet and other modern technology were not
available.' '5
Communism has since faded as viable ideology. To Pyongyang's detriment, South Korea, which was supposedly worse off than North in the
1960s, has since managed phenomenal economic growth. The state monitoring system, which forcefully watched over whether anyone makes any
blasphemous remarks on Kim Il-sung, weakened through the famine.
Kim Jong-un is not as compelling a leader as his predecessors. Kim Ilsung built his power base touting his struggle for Korean independence
against Japanese colonists. Kim Jong-il had been a de facto leader, and had
been in the public eye at least since the 1970s, before he officially assumed
power in 1994. Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, is a young leader and a
relatively new face, with few achievements to show for it. There was an
expectation for change when Kim Jong-un, who allegedly received his education in Switzerland, first came to power in December 2011. It subsided,
114. See JOHN EVERARD, YEONGKUK OEGYOGWAN PYONGYANG-ESEO
900-IL, (A U.K. diplomat spending 900 days in Pyongyang); SEONG-HA Ju,
BARO BOKI
IYAKI

(Taking a Right Look at North Korea);

(Tale of Pyongyang Written in Seoul).
115. See also ANDREI LANKOv, THE REAL

THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA

(2014).
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however, when he proved to be the same type of a closed, repressive ruler
as his father and grandfather.
The execution of Jang Seong-taek, Kim Jong-un's uncle, 1 6 hit the
headlines in December 2013. To solidify his power in the chaotic days of
the 1940s and 1950s, Kim Il-sung purged some of his socialist comrades
and rivals such as Pak Heon-yeong. The method served Kim well, as it
cleared the way for him to evolve as a glorified character under the juche
philosophy. His grandson, Kim Jong-un, draws from the same approach, as
he gets rid of his much older competitors by the dozen."17 Whether such a
Machiavellian style of governance will continue to work in the twenty-first
century remains to be seen.
2.

Economic Changes

Donju, a class of nouveau riche who acquired wealth from commercial
activities, is springing up not just in the capital, but in almost all major
cities in DPRK. Traditionally, the richest people in North Korea were those
at the top of WPK and the military, who enjoyed spoils from state businesses. Recently, however, the new capitalist class is emerging as a new
force. Donju act as corporate executives in transportation, real estate, trading and other sectors, and manage investment, business development, and
human resources. In a country with crumbled financial institutions, donju
feed much needed capital, and local economies would freeze without their
economic resources. To protect their status, donju give bribes and lend
money to financially strapped government enterprises. Stable collusion between the government and the new bourgeois can add to Kim's power. Alternatively, any discontent seething from those who tasted the fruit of
18
capitalism can have a destructive result."
116. Jang was one of the protectors who guided Kim Jong-un to power, after Kim
Jong-il fell ill in the 2000s and became virtually unable to attend to national
administration.
117. According to Gukga-jeongbo-won (National Intelligence Service), the number of high officials who were executed was 3 in 2012, more than 30 in 2013, and 31 in
2014. See Hankook Ilbo, Kim Jong-un-ui gongpo-tongchi-neun leadership bulan
bangleung, buk ganbu 70-yeomyeong sukcheong (Kim Jong-un's Rule of Terror Gives

Circumstantial Evidence of His Uncertain Leadership, more than 70 high officials were
purged), HANKOOKI.COM, http://daily.hankooki.com11page/politics/201505fdh2015051
3121805137590.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
118. See generally Kim Hwan Yong, Private Lenders Emerge as North Korea's
New Middle Class, VOICE OF AM. (June 10, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/

private-lenders-emerge-as-north-korea-new-middle-class/2816737.html;

Ju-Min

Pak

and James Pearson, Pyongyang Bling - The Rise of North Korea's Consumer Comrades, REUTERS (June 4, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/04/uk-northkorea-
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ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE

(Unit: %)

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

CROP PRODUCTION

(Unit: 1,000 metric tons)

a ,, 4,806 4,802

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

North Koreans no longer starve to death by the hundreds of thousands
as they did in the 1990s. The North Korean economy contracted from 1990
to 1998, but modestly expanded from 1999 to 2005. Food production also
rose from 3.5 million tons in 1998 to 4.8 million tons in 2014, and is now at
a level where the country can sustain itself with foreign food aid. 19 However, DPRK by no means is an affluent country. Everything from petroleum

change-consumption-idUKKBNOOJ2UY20150604;

Bukhan-eun jikeum donjudeul-ui

jeonseong-sidae (Donju are having a prime time in North Korea), RADIO FREE ASIA,
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/bd8 Id55c-c774ac8c-bb38c8 Icc9cOc694/fecp-062320151051 10.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
119. Bukhan tong'gye (North Korean Statistics), STATISTIC KOREA, http://kosis.kr/
bukhan/statisticsList/statisticsListO1List.jsp#SubCont (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
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to drinking water to automobiles is in short supply, and a large number of
20
residents are still undernourished.'
As North Koreans suffered through starvation in the 1990s, corruption
became rampant as a survival mechanism. Now giving and receiving bribes
are a routine method of operation. Money can open doors to such "reactionary" activities as watching South Korean TV or travelling inside the country
without state authorization. The central government would not risk breaking
the entrenched link of illegality, particularly since it does not have enough
money to pay state employees. 12 '
Unlike Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un himself experienced capitalism when he attended school in Europe, and may not be
against it as much. Furthermore, in the absence of much government support, closing markets down and depriving residents of the last means of
livelihood would trigger nationwide rebellion. People have little time to
mull over the meaning of democracy when they struggle for daily existence.
When their life gets a bit better, however, they can look around themselves,
and that's when autocracy should be most worried.
3. Hallyu
What would be most destabilizing to the regime is the "Korean wave"
of entertainment sweeping through North Korea. South Korean TV shows,
which gained popularity in Asia and other parts of the world beginning in
1990s, finally landed in DPRK. North Koreans most commonly sample
South Korean media through compact discs and USB drives smuggled from
China. To earn foreign exchange, Pyongyang is sending tens of thousands
of workers to China and the Middle East, who may get further exposure to
South Korean culture. Seoul accent and style appear to be trendy among
some young people.
Perhaps the phenomenon of K-pop may have been exaggerated. It is
hard to accurately gauge the extent and effect of K-pop on North Korean
residents. Even if they have unprecedented access, they may only get a
distorted or inaccurate image of the outside world therefrom. 122 The fact
nonetheless is that Pyongyang is no longer retaining absolute control over
what the population is seeing and hearing.
120. See generally Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9.
121. EVERARD, supra note 144.
122. Hankook Ilbo, Bukhan-e buneun "Hallyu yeolpung," cheje jeohang bureuji
aneuldeut (The hot wind of hallyu blowing in North Korea won't induce anti-regime
resistance), HANKOOKI.COM, http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/politics/201502/
e2015021316012193140.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
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Ground Shift

It was easy to stay loyal to the government and its dogma when the
state provided a social safety net for everyone. Those comfortable days are
a distant memory now, however. Those who grew up in the 1990s and
2000s were basically left on their own without generous state subsidies, and
are not very familiar with communism in its raw form. What's more, the
state continuously solicits money and goods such as a shovel and a pig,
from residents to replenish its revenue. 23 Communist DPRK is officially a
country without taxation, 24 but commoners are directed to cough off a large
portion of their hard-earned money. On the other hand, education, medical
care, electricity and other basic services, which are to be granted free of
25
charge under the constitution, are sorely lacking.
Faith in the government wore away drastically, and unqualified loyalty
is hard to find now. Grass-roots swelling is far more formidable than diplomatic pressure from other countries. All the rounds of six-party negotiations
and minute intellectual exercise on the ways to enforce international law
become ancillary, if North Koreans bring criminals to justice themselves.
The elite in DPRK are evidently aware of what happened to despots
like Nicolae Ceausescu and Muammar Gaddafi, and cannot help but dread
an uprising and revenge by the downtrodden. Domestic rebel forces often
provide the impetus toppling autocracy. No such groups are tolerated in
North Korea now, and any defiance against the dictatorship thus far has
been viciously crushed. Still, no one knows how much longer the populace
will put up with their non-functioning state.
C.

Fundamental Rights

One of the criticisms against NKHRA is that pressing Pyongyang with
human rights would unnecessarily antagonize it.126 The argument is that it is
time to work on mitigating the relationship between the two Koreas, not on
impairing it. What is clear, however, is that North Korea's hostility toward
123. The pretext for such extraction varies from building a power plant and housing, to financing national defense and facilitating recovery efforts of a flooded village.
124. Pyongyang officially eliminated tax in 1974, and celebrates April I as the
day of tax abolition. Even thereafter, however, the central bank levied some sort of
duties on enterprises, imports from China, land use, and so on.
125. Elevators at high-rise apartments in Pyongyang frequently stop for power
shortage. Patients pay for treatment at an underequipped clinic, and students need to
provide money or goods to attend school.
126. KWANG-DEUK PARK, BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP-UI HYEONSIL-GWA GAESEONBANGHYANG (Reality of the North Korean Human Rights Act and Directions for

Improvement).
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South persisted regardless of whether Seoul is confrontational, or more accommodating of North. Military provocation continued during the liberal
Kim Dae-jung administration, such as the North Korean attacks on the
South Korean navy along the western coast in June 1999 and June 2002.
Nuclear development proceeded throughout the Roh Moo-hyun government. 127 Military attacks such as shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November 2010 erupted after years of North receiving help from South.
Pyongyang does not have much leverage in its dealings with other
stakeholders. DPRK's official policy is to soon complete a war unifying the
Korean peninsula. It fully knows, however, that an all-out war against much
wealthier adversaries would wipe it out. 128 Moreover, human rights are not
something that should be hidden and discarded so as not "to irritate a bully
on the block." Normalization of inter-Korean relationships cannot materialize without human rights improvement in DPRK. A state which willingly
starves its population cannot be expected to have sincere exchanges with
other countries. Constantly trying to placate the rogue regime to prevent it
from doing something foolish won't provide a solution.

127. Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, and
held nuclear experiments in October 2006 and May 2009. See Bukhan haek-wiki (North
Korean Nuclear Crisis), MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/
term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex= l 1&dicaryld=91 &searchCnd=0&searchWrd=
(last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
128. In quantitative terms, North Korean military is superior to that in South Korea. The number of soldiers in North is more than 700,000, compared to 495,000 in
South. See World's Largest Armies, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). North
also has more tanks, field guns, warships, and so on. See also North Korea Army Tanks,
Vehicles and Artillery (Since 1950), MILITARY FACTORY (Dec. 14, 2015), http://
www.militaryfactory.com/armor/north-korean-army.asp. Weaponry in North, however,
is generally antiquated, some dating from the Soviet era, and fuel and supplies to keep
battles going are in severe shortage. See id. Furthermore, intercession by the U.S. will
make a war not winnable for Pyongyang. See generally Bukhan byeongryeok, namhanui "2-bae" . . . choecheomdan muki apsewo kong'gyeok haedo [North Korean Fighting

Force is Twice That of South Korea, Even if South Korea Strikes with State-of-the-Art
Equipment, It Won't Win], JTBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://news.jtbc.joins.com/
article/article.aspx?newsid=NB10241374. Of course, a suicidal war to destroy South
Korea as well as itself cannot be ruled out. See also South Korea 2014 Defense White
PaperHighlights DPRK Nuclear Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES (Jan.

6, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/south-korea-2014-defense-white-paper-highlightsdprk-nuclear-threats.
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D.

National Assembly

Below, we will explore the South Korean president's human rights and
general policy toward DPRK since the 1990s. This paper will subsequently
delve into the responsibility of NKHRA and the National Assembly in this
29
policy arena.'
Seoul, as Washington's friend in its ideological crusade, was staunchly
anti-communist during the Cold War. Communist DPRK was a foe to be
conquered. The South Korean government was not in a position to object to
a breach of human rights in the north in the 1970s and 1980s, however,
since South itself was under military rule. Things changed in the 1990s
when the USSR fell and Seoul began to build diplomatic relations with
former socialist countries.
The relationship between South and North Korea since the 1990s had
ups and downs. President Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun, who highly
desired historical summit meetings in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-il in June
2000 and October 2007 respectively, were relatively lenient toward North.
Under Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine, or Engagement Policy, South's aid to
DPRK greatly increased, which should have been of great help during the
food crisis. South Korean tourist visit to Mount Kumgang commenced in
November 1998, and a discussion began on creating an industrial region in
Kaesong.' 30 North Korean human rights, however, was not a favorite topic
of President Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his humanitarian works in South Korea and other countries in East Asia.
The Roh administration adhered to appeasement toward Pyongyang.
President Roh, who previously made a name for himself as a human rights
lawyer, was reluctant to bring up human rights, even as the administration
communicated with North extensively over a host of other questions. In
fact, the South Korean government under President Roh did not attend, or
abstained from voting on North Korean human rights resolution at the UN
General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights, and Human Rights
Council. The administration voted in favor only in 2006 at the General Assembly after international outrage over DPRK's nuclear testing.

129.

EUNG-JIN YEON, HANKOOK-UI DAEBUK-JEONRYAK-E DAEHAN YEONKU

[Study

on South Korea's North Korean Strategy].
130.

HYUN

Soo

JUNG,

KIM DAE-JUNG JEONGBU

YADANG-Ul SEONTAEK: HAENGTAE-WA YEOKHAL

DAEBUK-JEONGCHAEK-ESEOUI

[Kim Dae-jung Government and the

Choice of the Grand National Party on North Korean Policy].
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See Voting by the South Korean Government, MINIs'rRY o1 UNIFICATION, http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/
nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex=1O&dicaryld=93&searchCnd=O&searchWrd= (last visited
Mar. 11, 2016).

Pyongyang wishes to procure as much aid as possible from its neighbors, without having to listen to their incessant rebuke. Lee Myung-bak's
election to presidency in December 2007 therefore was most unwelcome
news. The Lee administration audaciously announced the "denuclearization,
reform and 3,000 plan," whereby Seoul would help North Koreans attain a
per capita GDP of $3,000 if Pyongyang would give up its nuclear program
and open up the country. As for human rights, President Lee reiterated on
various occasions a need to bring about progress in North Korean human
rights, including when he met President Bush in Seoul in August 2008.
South Korea now began to vote in favor of resolutions at the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.
Strict policies against North continued in the Park Geun-hye administration. At the keynote address at the 69th General Assembly in September
2014, President Park urged Pyongyang to take necessary measures to implement recommendations by CO1.131 Upon opening of the UN Higher Commission field office in Seoul in June 2015, Park pointed to the important
role the office would play. Park also underscored the importance of NKHRA, both as president and when she was running for president.
In the political system in South Korea, presidency has been the branch
of the government primarily driving inter-Korean policy. The policy closely
followed the ideological inclination of the chief executive, and a new president meant a new rule. The role of the National Assembly, on the other
hand, has been narrower. 132 The Assembly ratifies legislations on inter-Ko131. During the speech, DPRK delegates sat in front seats facing President Park.
132. JONG-SU KIM, DAEBUK-JEONGCHAEK-SUHAENG-E ISS'EO KUKHEO-YEOKHAL
JEGO-BANG'AN YEONKU [Reconsideration of the Role of the National Assembly Regarding Administration of North Korean Policy].
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rean matters to be enforced by the administrative branch. Non-legislative
acts include resolutions requiring dialogues between the two countries, or
denouncing military assault and missile launch. 133 Lawmakers also have the
power to hold hearings and review foreign policy of the administration, and
approve an agreement 34 with the North Korean government on such matters as investment, 135 avoidance of double taxation, 136 and railways
37

operation. 1

Beyond such measures, there is not much policy making by the National Assembly toward North Korea. Once the Assembly adopts law on
39
unification education, 38 support of defectors settling in South Korea, operation of Kaesong complex,'140 and so on, responsibility of daily management falls on the Unification Ministry and other administrative agencies,
non-profit organizations such as Red Cross, even private corporations in
Kaesong, which employed North Korean workers. Major accords such as
the joint declaration by South and North on July 4, 1972, and the agreement
on December 13, 1991, after the two Koreas simultaneously became mem133. The Assembly, for instance, released a resolution in June 2010 condemning
the attack on Cheonan warship.
134. These agreements are initially signed by administrative officials, but need

authorization by the Assembly to take effect.
GUKHOE-UI

YEOKHAL

BO-HYUK SUH, NAMBUK-GWANGYE-ESEO

[The Role of the National Assembly

in Inter-Korean

Relationship].
135.

NAMBUK-SAI-Ul

TUJA-BOJANG-E GWANHAN

HAPUISEO

[Inter-Korean Agree-

ment on Investment Guarantee]. The four major agreements on investment guarantee,
avoidance of double taxation, resolution of commercial disputes, and settlement of
clearance were signed in December 2000 after the ministerial conference in August
2000, and went into effect in August 2003. Id.
136. See Agreement on Investment Protectionbetween the South and North,

MIN-

http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1889&mode=view
&page=6&cid=32108 (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
ISTRY OF UNIFICATION,

137. See Agreement Made at the 2nd Meeting of Working-level Consultations on

the Connection of South-North Railways and Roads, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, http://
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid= 1889&mode=view&page=5&cid=32123.
138. See UNIFICATION EDUCATION SUPPORT ACT, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/
eng-mobile/viewer.do?hseq=24681&type=part&key=I (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
This act first went into effect in August 1999. Id. This and other laws have undergone
several amendments since they were first enacted.
139. See NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES & SETTLEMENT SUPPORT ACT, http://
elaw.klri.re.kr/eng-mobile/viewer.do?hseq=20154&type=part&key= I (last visited Mar.
12, 2016). This act took effect in July 1997. Id.
140. See Kaesong Industrial Zone Support Act, RELIABLE MINISTRY OF GOV'T
LEGIS., http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuld= l &query=Kaesong+Industrial+
Zone+Support+Act+&x=0&y=0#AJAX (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). This act went into
effect in August 2007. Id.
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bers of the UN were issued unilaterally without consent from the National
Assembly. Unlike in the administrative branch, which revolves around the
President, power is more dispersed in the legislative chamber. There is no
one towering leader who can assert its overarching policy on North Korea.
In that regard, NKHRA provides a forum for the Assembly to unite its
commitment to human rights protection. Under Article 15, the Unification
Minister is required to report to the National Assembly the human rights
situation, the outcome of efforts to promote human rights, and other relevant information. Under such a framework, the law would enable the lawmaking body to check and monitor the executive branch, and carve out a
proper place in this important national question.
CONCLUSION

The objectives of NKHRA are threefold: (1) to affirm South Korea
would not tolerate human rights violations in North Korea, (2) to warn
wrongdoers of consequences of their violence, and (3) to prepare for transitional justice after the totalitarian rule disintegrates. In ancient times before
the notion of human equality was fully manifested, a king could do as he
pleased. Human rights are a topic of urgent priority in the twenty-first century, however, and the global media is on alert to detect incidents of human
rights violations around the world.
International human rights stand at a cross-section between moral intervention and national autonomy. A self-governing nation should be free
from meddling by foreign states and international organizations. Human
rights are a shared value, however, and there are transnational norms to
conform to. If domestic institutions do not have a means of penalizing
crimes against humanity, the global community does. Under the theory of
14 1
universal jurisdiction, there is no haven for those committing atrocities.
Whether a government has a right to intrude into internal affairs of
another country is always a thorny question. Seoul is not entitled to intervene on how Pyongyang should behave. It should, however, be noted that
South Korean aid to North did not halt even during the latter's military
assaults and nuclear experiment. Pyongyang has not expressed gratefulness

141. The best-known application of the universal jurisdiction theory was for the
trial of Augusto Pinochet, who was a dictator of Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. In
October 1998, Magistrate Baltasar Garzon issued an arrest warrant for Pinochet, who
was staying in the United Kingdom. Magistrate Garzon relied on the Spanish law,
which extends criminal prosecution to acts by a non-Spanish citizen outside of Spain.
See generallyNaomi Roht-Arriaza, The PinochetPrecedentand UniversalJurisdiction,
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2001).
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for the economic support it received, and never promised to eschew future
aggression.
The South Korean government does not generally ponder on how to
protect human rights in other countries, and the National Assembly had
never legislated law to that effect. North Korea is different, however. The
two Koreas share language, history, and civilization. Seoul is the very party
which should start the human rights exchange, and human rights should be
one of the first issues to be resolved before and after national unification.
NKHRA is not aimed at invading North Korea or ousting the Kim
Jong-un regime. Nor should it be deployed as a tool of partisan politics. The
ultimate goal should be to help deter further cruelty in the north. It should
be endorsed with broad consent from all sides, procedurally and substantively, and should not be steamrollered through the Assembly by the majority party.
Human rights are breached in South Korea, too, but in South, means
are available for citizens to file their claim against the government. Public
protest is impossible, north of the Demarcation Line. Even if NKHRA does
not have much physical impact and human rights are a politically charged
matter, even if the Kim Jong-un dictatorship will not dissolve anytime soon,
South Koreans should not just keep quiet and condone acts of violence.
Insanity has been tolerated too long, and speaking out against it is the least
that could be done.

